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Abstract 
A simple rule for the optimal global price of carbon is presented, which captures the geo-physical, 
economic, and ethical drivers of climate policy as well as the effect of uncertainty about future growth 
of consumption. There is also a discussion of the optimal carbon budget and the amount of unburnable 
carbon and stranded fossil fuel reserves and a back-on-the-envelope expression are given for 
calculating these. It is also shown how one can derive the end of the carbon era and peak warming. 
This simple arithmetic for determining climate policy is meant to complement the simulations of 
large-scale integrated assessment model, and to give analytical understanding of the key determinants 
of climate policy. The simple rules perform very well in a full integrated assessment model. It is also 
shown how to take account of a 2 °C upper limit on global warming. Steady increases in the efficiency 
of labour do not affect the optimal price of carbon or the safe carbon budget, but do postpone the 
carbon-free era. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change is the world largest externality (Stern, 2007) and climate policy needs to correct this 
externality by establishing cost transparency in the energy market. Fossil fuels are currently too cheap, 
since users of this energy type are not shouldering the cost of future climate damages and renewable 
energy is still in its infancy. The introduction of a carbon tax (or a cap on overall emissions levels), 
will shift demand in the global energy system away from dirty towards carbon-free energy sources. It 
will also increase the cost of energy overall, at least in the short run while efficiency improvements in 
the renewable energy sector are still ongoing, making investments in energy demand reductions more 
attractive. Here we present the arithmetic underlying carbon pricing and show how to calculate in a 
simple way the optimal timing of the transition to the carbon-free era and the amount of cumulative 
carbon emissions and peak global warming. Our rule for the carbon price is simple but robust and can 
be useful for analysing the effects of carbon pricing on patterns of energy generation and energy use. 
Climate policy has to combine ethical judgments with projections about future economic, 
technological, and climatic developments. Integrated assessment models (IAMs) aim to do this, but 
have been criticised for being highly complex, insufficiently open access, and underestimating the 
threats of climate change (Stern, 2016). We present a simple framework that captures the essence of 
IAMs, makes their underlying assumptions transparent, and opens the discussion of the political and 
social obstacles to climate policy. Our cost-benefit analysis of climate action yields a simple rule for 
the optimal global price of carbon in the presence of a backstop renewable energy source that is 
currently more expensive than fossil fuel. This price is proportional to current world GDP and depends 
on key ethical considerations, damage flows and geophysical parameters. We also offer rules for the 
optimal fraction of fossil fuel reserves that should be left in the crust of the earth (cf. Carbon Tracker, 
2013; McGlade and Ekins, 2015) and the optimal transition time to the carbon-free era. Our 
calculations require only a pencil and the back of an envelope, but yield values very close to those 
obtained from numerically maximising welfare with a detailed IAM of growth, development, energy 
and climate change. We hope that our simple arithmetic helps policy makers and climate scientists to 
gain a better understanding of the ethical, economic and geo-physical drivers of optimal climate 
policy.5  
The outlay of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the multi-box carbon cycle and the cost of 
emitting carbon, section 3 discusses the intergenerational ethics and the risk-adjusted discount rate, 
section 4 presents our simple rule for the optimal price of carbon, section 5 derives the optimal carbon 
budget and the amount of stranded fossil fuel reserves, and section 6 shows how to calculate the onset 
of the carbon-free era and peak warming. Section 7 puts it all together, and section 8 offers a 
calibration and illustrates our analysis with some illustrative simulations. Section 9 shows how to take 
                                                            
5 Allen (2016) also offers a simple framework for analysing the drivers of peak warming and the optimal carbon 
budget in a consumer-maximising world, but focuses on the need for carbon capture and sequestration rather 
than the transition to renewable energy and does not discuss the ethical drivers of climate policy or the optimal 
timing of the transition to the carbon-free era. 
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account of a 2 degrees Celsius upper limit on global warming. Section 10 shows how well our simple 
arithmetic of climate policy performs in a full integrated assessment model. Section 11 discusses 
carbon capture and sequestration. Section 12 concludes.  
 
2. The Carbon Cycle and the Cost of Emitting Carbon 
The global price of emitting carbon, P, should generally be set to the social cost of carbon, which is 
the present discounted value of all future economic damages from emitting one ton of carbon today. 
This price can be levied via either a carbon tax or an emissions permit. To compute future economic 
damages, we allow for n different parts of the atmospheric carbon stock each one of them decaying at 
a different rate. This leads to a so-called n-box model of the carbon cycle. With the fraction ai of each 
emitted ton entering a box i with exponential decay rate bi, the amount left in the atmosphere after t 
years equals 
1
(1 ) .
n t
i ii
a b

  The easiest is to have a 2-box carbon cycle (i.e., n = 2) with the first box 
consisting of the permanent component of atmospheric carbon which corresponds to the 20% of 
carbon emissions stays up for thousands of years in the atmosphere (a1 = 0.2, b1 = 0) and a second box 
consisting of the transient component of atmospheric carbon (a2 = 0.32 and b2 = 0.0023). Such a 
simple modelling of the carbon cycle captures well the carbon cycle of the most prominent IAM, i.e., 
DICE set out in Nordhaus (2008) (Golosov et al., 2014).6 
Next, we assume that the flow damage at time t of an extra ton of atmospheric carbon is proportional 
to world GDP, i.e., ,td GDP  where d is estimated to be 5.3% of GDP at roughly 2°C based on DICE 
and does not vary much with temperature (Golosov et al., 2014). 7  It takes a long time before changes 
in the stock of atmospheric carbon affect global mean temperature and cause damages to aggregate 
production. We model this by allowing for a simple exponential lag between projected global mean 
temperature and the damages that result from that on the one hand and the stock of atmospheric carbon 
of l years on the other hand. We denote the mean of this exponential lag by the parameter l. In our 
baseline calibration we take this mean lag l to be 70 years. 
 
3. Intergenerational Ethics and the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate 
Given that climate change resulting from burning carbon today occurs decades or centuries ahead, the 
flow damages computed above have to be summed and discounted taking account of the slow uptake 
of atmospheric carbon in biosphere and oceans. Economists use the social discount rate, SDR, for this, 
which is a concept that has been hotly debated in climate economics (Stern, 2007; Nordhaus, 2007; 
Weitzman, 2007). The pure rate of time preference or alternatively the rate of time impatience is 
                                                            
6 A 3-box model leads to a slightly better short-run temperature response (Gerlagh and Liski, 2017). 
7 Most IAMs assume damages as a fraction of GDP to be convex in temperature while temperature is usually 
concave (logarithmic) in atmospheric concentrations so that the overall effect gives a near linear relationship. 
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denoted by RTI.  The growth-corrected social discount rate, i.e., SDR – g, consists of the RTI plus four 
corrections to allow for the rising affluence of generations, damages growing at the same rate as world 
GDP, risk aversion and prudence, and stochastic shocks to damages being proportional to shocks to 
future world GDP, respectively. These corrections are summarised by the following generalised 
Keynes-Ramsey rule for distributing consumption optimally over time:  
(1) 2 2
1
2
SDR g RTI IIA g g RRA PRU RRA              
(e.g., Gollier, 2013). The first two terms on the right-hand side of the expression (1) trade off the rate 
of time impatience, RTI, which indicates how much less valuable consumption of future generations is 
simply because it occurs in the future, and the ethical judgement about the permissible levels of 
income inequality across generations. If living standards are proxied by the world GDP and grow at a 
constant rate g > 0, future generations will be richer than current generations and the latter should be 
spared costly investments simply because they are poorer already. This effect is strong if the growth 
rate, g, and the coefficient of relative intergenerational inequality aversion, denoted by IIA, are large. 
Note that the parameter IIA in this second term corresponds to the inverse of the usual elasticity of 
marginal consumption (often denoted by ) and for the case of expected utility analysis corresponds to 
the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, denoted by RRA, too. With more general non-
expected utility analysis the two parameters IIA and RRA can be freely chosen from each other and the 
parameter restriction IIA = 1/RRA no longer needs to hold (Epstein and Zin, 1989). The third term in 
(1) is –g and ensures that the SDR is the growth-corrected social discount rate to reflect that damages 
from global warming are proportional to world GDP and thus grow at the rate g too. The fourth term 
in (1) is the SDR and corresponds to the prudence effect, which is large if the variance of expected 
future consumption growth, denoted by 2 ,  the coefficient of relative risk aversion, RRA, and the 
coefficient of relative prudence, denoted by PRU (which is equal to 1+IIA for power utility functions 
and for Epstein-Zin preferences) are high (cf. Kimball, 1990). It pushes down the SDR and will make 
climate policy more ambitious. The fifth term in (1) captures risk aversion with respect to uncertainty 
about future damages which are perfectly correlated with future GDP. It pushes up the SDR and will 
make climate policy less ambitious, since shocks that increase future damages also increase future 
GDP and are thus easier to take care of in the future. This is akin to a “climate beta” effect (cf. Dietz et 
al., 2017).  
We can rewrite (1) to obtain an alternative expression for the growth-corrected SDR: 
(1) 2
1
( 1)    with   ,
2
SDR g RTI IIA g g g RRA           
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where g  is the trend growth rate corrected for risk aversion with respect to uncertain future 
consumption growth and consequent damages from global warming.8 Following Nordhaus (2008), we 
use baseline values for the RTI of 1.5% per annum and for the IIA and the RRA of 1.45. The baseline 
standard deviation of global annual consumption growth had a standard deviation of 3.6 percent over 
much of the past century and our baseline thus sets  = 0.036. Hence the growth correction to allow 
for both prudence and stochastic damages in expression (1), i.e., 
20.5 RRA    , is only 0.094% 
per annum which depresses the growth-corrected SDR by a mere 0.042% per annum, i.e., 
20.5 ( 1) .IIA RRA       The prudence term in expression (1), i.e., 20.5 ,RRA PRU      
depresses the SDR  by 0.23% per annum. 
 
4. Simple Rule for the Global Price of Carbon 
Taking the present value of the flow damages of what is left in the atmosphere at each future point of 
time and using (1) for the growth-corrected SDR gives our rule for the optimal price of carbon, P: 
(2) 
1
(1 )1
   with   .
1 ( )
n
i i
i i
a b
P d GDP
SDR g l SDR g b
   
     
      
  
This rule offers the following insights into the drivers of climate policy. First, the optimal global price 
of carbon is proportional to and rises with world GDP, about 66 trillion US dollars in 2010, and to the 
flow cost of global warming per ton of emitted carbon, d. Second, the global carbon price is high if the 
SDR is low, which from (1) is the case if welfare of future generations is not discounted much (low 
RTI) and, given trend GDP growth, intergenerational inequality aversion is weak (low IIA). Third, if 
IIA > 1, the ethical positive effect of higher trend growth (higher g) on the SDR via richer future 
generations dominates the negative effect on SDRg due to faster growing damages of global 
warming. This depresses the optimal price of carbon. In contrast, more uncertainty about future 
consumption growth, especially if risk aversion is substantial (high RRA), curbs the growth-corrected 
discount rate and boosts the price of carbon. Fourth, lower decay rates of atmospheric carbon (higher 
bi) and a shorter temperature lag (low l) increase the carbon price due to longer-lasting and more 
immediate damages. Energy efficiency does not impact the optimal price of carbon. 
 
5. The Energy Transition, the Carbon Budget, and Stranded Fossil Fuel Reserves 
Recent studies quantify the amount of fossil fuel which must be abandoned in the crust of the earth for 
global warming to stay below 2oC (McGlade and Ekins, 2015).9 Underlying such estimates is the basic 
                                                            
8 Gollier (2013) uses SDR = RTI + IIAg  0.5 RRAPRU2, where PRU = 1+IIA. 
9 This study follows Meinshausen et al. (2009) by focusing on cumulative emissions up to 2050. This is 
misleading as peak global warming depends on cumulative emissions forever into the future (e.g., Allen et al., 
2009; Allen, 2016). 
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economic idea that fossil fuels are used as long as they are cheaper than renewable energy. The carbon 
price increases the cost of fossil energy and ensures that renewable energy is phased in earlier. To 
estimate the optimal carbon budget, we suppose that the cost of extracting one ton of carbon falls with 
time due to directed technical progress at the rate rE (e.g., due to the recent innovation of horizontal 
drilling in fracking shale gas) and becomes more expensive over time as less accessible fields have to 
be explored, hence 10 0( ) (1 ) ( / ( ))
et
EE t E r S S t  with S(t) denoting reserves at time t. We calibrate the 
initial cost of fossil fuel extraction so that the energy sector is 5% of GDP, hence E0 = 0.35 T$/GtC, 
and set S0 = 10,000 GtC, e1 = 0.5 and rE = 0 (cf. Rezai and van der Ploeg, 2016). The cost of renewable 
energy R (including cost of infrastructure and feed-in subsidies to foster learning by doing) falls at the 
rate rR due to directed technical progress, where following Nordhaus (2014) we suppose that 
producing from carbon-free alternatives costs 5.6% of GDP today and 2.7% of GDP at the end of the 
century, hence R0 = 0.8T$/GtCe and rR = 1% per annum until the price of renewable energy reaches its 
lower floor of 0.4T$/GtCe near the end of the century (cf. Rezai and van der Ploeg, 2016). At time T, 
0( ) ( ) (1 )
T
RE T P T R r    so from then onwards fossil fuel is too expensive and is priced out of the 
market. This transition condition gives the optimal cumulative emissions or the safe carbon budget for 
short, 0 ( ) :B S S T    
(3) 
 
1
1
0
0
0 0
(1 )
1 .
(1 ) , (1 )
T e
E
T T
E r
B S
R r SDR g d g GDP
 
  
          
   
The carbon budget is low if fossil fuel is expensive to extract and if renewable energy is cheap to 
produce (high E0 and low R0). The carbon budget is curbed by the ethical, economic and geo-physical 
factors that drive up the price of carbon (high SDRg or high  from (1) and (2), high d and high 
GDP0). If fossil fuel extraction is expected to experience rapid directed technical progress, the optimal 
carbon budget will be higher. If renewable energy is expected to experience rapid technical progress 
(as is the case now for solar energy), the optimal carbon budget ends up lower as climate policy has 
become cheaper. The fraction of stranded fossil fuel assets, 0 0 0( ) / ( ) / ,S T S S B S   is then high. 
 
6. End of Carbon Era and Peak Warming 
Generally, more energy-efficient technologies are described in a stylised fashion as using higher 
capital and less energy inputs. Such technologies arise when less fossil fuel energy inputs are used in 
favour of more capital in response to, say, a tax on the use of fossil fuel. However, empirical evidence 
suggests that there is limited substitutability between energy and capital and labour (Hassler et al., 
2013) in which case fossil fuel use is proportional to aggregate output. More specifically, fossil fuel 
use is given by 0 (1 ) ,
t
tr GDP   where the initial energy intensity 0  is calibrated at 0.15 GtC per 
trillion dollars of world GDP (cf. Rezai and van der Ploeg, 2016). There might be a negative 
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exponential trend in the energy intensity or carbon intensities of output at the rate 0.r   If 0,r   
then the energy efficiency of the world economy increases over time. A different way of looking at 
this is that renewable energies and fossil fuel energies are bad substitutes as long as the problem of 
storage is not solved in a cost-efficient manner. More efficient-energy technologies can then be seen as 
those which use more renewable and less fossil fuel energies.  
The carbon era ends when the total carbon emitted equals the carbon budget, .B  This implies that
1
0 0 01
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1 / ( ),
T t t T
t
B g r GDP g r GDP g r   


           and thus gives the optimal transition 
time to the carbon-free era: 
(4) 
0 0 0 0
1
ln 1 ( ) 1   if   ,     1   .
B B
T g r r g T r g
g r GDP GDP
  
  
 
        
  
 
The transition thus occurs more quickly if the carbon budget B is small, expected economic growth g 
is high and the rate of increase in energy efficiency r  is small. More specifically, an increase in the 
rate of growth in energy efficiency implies that it takes longer for the safe carbon budget to be 
exhausted (larger T) but does not affect the price of carbon or the safe carbon budget itself. 
Finally, there is a robust relationship between cumulative emissions and peak warming as the pathway 
of carbon emissions matters less than the cumulative emissions B (Allen et al., 2009):   
(5) ( ), ' 0, '' 0.PW B      
Although a linear approximation to (5) works reasonable well (Allen, 2016), we use a quadratic which 
is slightly more accurate. 10 The carbon budget from pre-industrial times onwards corresponding to a 
maximum of 2°C is 1 TtC, implying a carbon budget for cumulative emissions of 350 GtC or 1283 
GtCO2 from 2010 onwards.  
 
7. Putting It Together 
Figure 1 solves (3) through (5) for the carbon budget B, the time T that the carbon-free era starts, and 
peak warming, both for the social optimum if carbon is priced (see the upward-sloping solid line) 
according to (1) and (2) and for the business as usual scenario (BAU, see the upward-sloping dashed 
line) if climate policy is absent (P = 0).11 In the bottom panel of Figure 1, the carbon budget B falls 
through (3) as the price of carbon is imposed. This implies a quicker transition to renewable energy 
and lower peak warming (left axis). The top panel illustrates the underlying transitional dynamics in 
                                                            
10 Allen et al. (2016) suggests PW = 0.9 + 2 B/1000, which gives B equal to 550 GtC or 2017 GtCO2. See 
Appendix A. 
11 We need to solve the simultaneous equations (3) and (4) for B and T, which is done in the Excel sheet 
accompanying this paper. Only with no technical change whatsoever, g = rE = rR = 0, is the system recursive. 
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the energy market. As cumulative emissions increase, the cost of extracting the remaining stock fossil 
fuel increases. Simultaneously, the cost of renewable energy decreases. The top panel shows that the 
transition to the carbon-free era occurs when the cost of fossil fuel has just exceeded that of renewable 
energy. The difference between the climate policy (the upward-sloping solid line in the top panel of 
Figure 1) and BAU (the upward-sloping dashed line) scenarios is the rising carbon tax as determined 
by rule (2). 
From (2) we know that a smaller SDR (due to more patience, less intergenerational inequality aversion 
and, if IIA > 1, lower trend GDP growth and more risk aversion), a lower decay rate, and a shorter 
temperature lag push up the carbon price and shift up the upward-sloping solid climate policy line in 
the top panel of Figure 1. Renewable energy then becomes competitive earlier when energy cost is 
relatively higher, leaving a bigger fraction of fossil fuel reserves stranded, and cutting cumulative 
emissions and peak warming. 
If the coefficient of intergenerational inequality aversion exceeds unity (IIA > 1), faster trend GDP 
growth makes future generations richer and decreases the ethical onus on current generations to curb 
emissions, especially if IIA is high, so the SDR rises and climate policy becomes less ambitious and 
temperature rises. A lower and falling cost of renewable energy shifts down the cost curve in the top 
panel (the downward-sloping solid line), which curbs the carbon budget, brings forward the carbon-
free era and cuts peak warming. The energy cost at the time of transition is now relatively lower. 
 
Figure 1: The rules (1)-(2) give the carbon budget and end of carbon era from (3)-(4) and peak 
warming from (5) in the bottom panel. The top panel illustrates the dynamics as fossil fuel 
extraction costs and the carbon price rise and the cost of renewable energy falls. 
 
 
 
Peak Warming, PW 
Cost of CCS and  
fossil and renewable energy 
BAU 
Climate Policy 
Carbon Budget, B 
2.8°C 
3.8°C 
Cost of fossil energy 
plus carbon tax Falling cost of 
renewable energy 
1,025 GtC 2,290 GtC 
PW0 + TCRE ∙ B 
Cost of fossil energy 
CCS 
350$/tC 
800$/tC 
377$/tC 
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8. Calibration and illustrative policy simulations 
Figure 1 and also the results of our back-of-the-envelope calculation shown in Table 2 that follow this 
are based on the baseline calibration summarised in Table 1. We find that in the baseline case with 
carbon pricing 1,046 GtC is burnt and global mean temperature relative to pre-industrial temperatures 
peaks at 2.8°C.  
Ethical 
Rate of time impatience: RTI = 1.5%/year 
Intergenerational inequality aversion and risk aversion:  IIA = RRA = 1.45 
Economic 
World economy:  GDP0 = 66 T$,  g = 2%/year,   = 0.036,  
Fossil fuel use per unit of world GDP:  0 = 0.15 GtC/T$, r = 0%/year 
Fossil fuel cost: E0 = 0.35 T$/GtC,  rE = 0,  e1 = 0.5,  
Renewable energy cost: R0 = 0.8 T$/GtC,  rR = 1%/year 
Flow damage as fraction of world GDP:  d = 0.053 $/tC 
Geophysical 
Initial stock of fossil fuel reserves: S0 = 10,000 GtC 
Coefficients permanent and transient box of carbon cycle: a1 = 0.2, b1 = 0, a2 = 0.32, b2 = 0.0023   
Average lag between temperature/damages and carbon stock: l = 70 years 
Transient climate response to cumulative emissions: TCRE = 2 oC/TtC 
Table 1: Baseline calibration of the back-on-the-envelope IAM 
Table 2 also reports some sensitivity exercises by illustrating the impact of ethical and economic 
drivers on the optimal carbon budget and peak warming. Ethical considerations influence the transition 
to renewable energy through the optimal carbon price. As society’s aversion to intergenerational 
inequality falls from 1.45 to 0.5, peak warming falls from 2.8oC to 1.8oC and the carbon budget from 
1,046 to 264 GtC. Similarly, not discounting welfare of future generations at all, i.e., RTI = 0, cuts 
peak warming to 2.1°C and the carbon budget to 465 GtC.  
Scenario PW Carbon Budget 
Baseline 2.8°C 1,046 GtC 
Ethical   
Lower inequality aversion (IIA = 0.5) 1.8°C 264 GtC 
Lower discount rate (RTI = 0%/yr) 2.1°C 465 GtC 
Economic   
Lower economic growth rate (g = 1%/yr) 2.6°C 836 GtC 
High Damage scenario (d = 0.08) 2.6°C 885 GtC 
Lower initial cost of renewable energy (R0 = 0.64 $T/GtC) 2.3°C 642 GtC 
Lower initial cost of fossil energy (E0 = 0.28 $T/GtC) 3.2°C 1,419 GtC 
Faster reductions in cost of renewable energy (rr = 2%/yr) 2.1°C 474 GtC 
Table 2: Sensitivity of peak warming and carbon budget to ethical and economic drivers 
If global economic growth slows from 2% to 1% per annum, future material affluence will be lower 
and the initial carbon price rises in order to shield future generations from climate-related damages to 
their weakened economy. Peak warming declines to 2.6°C corresponding to a fall of the carbon budget 
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to 836 GtC. Higher vulnerability of the economy to climate change in the form of higher damages has 
a similar effect on peak warming and the carbon budget. A 20% reduction in today’s cost of renewable 
(fossil) energy significantly expedites (delays) the transition to the carbon-free era and decreases 
(increases) peak warming to 2.3°C (3.2°C) and the carbon budget to 642 GtC (1,419 GtC). An 
acceleration of directed technical change in the renewable sector from 1 to 2% per annum, brings 
forward the energy transition and cuts peak warming to 2.1°C and the carbon budget to 473 GtC. The 
model can be used to calculate the impacts of shifts in the geophysical components in a similar 
fashion. 
To illustrate the trade-offs between ethical and economic drivers, Figure 2 shows contours of given 
peak warming levels for different economic and ethical parameters. The left panel of Figure 2 shows 
how the discount rate and the initial cost of renewable energy affect the optimal degree of peak global 
warming. Lower peak warming requires shifting closer to the origin, i.e., lower levels of discounting 
and initial costs. It also illustrates how given an ethical parameter, peak warming can be brought down 
by subsidies to renewable energy. The right panel of Figure 2 shows how optimal degrees of peak 
global warming can be achieved by different levels of IIA and the rate of directed technical change. 
Peak warming can be lowered by moving to the upper-left corner: lower preparedness to sacrifice 
utility to cut future global warming (higher IIA) requires more technical progress (higher rR) through 
policies stimulating innovation and R&D. Both panels illustrate how big the challenge and how 
ambitious policies must be to stay well below 2°C peak warming as agreed in Paris. 
      
Figure 2: Economic vs. ethical drivers of peak global warming 
Finally, let us now perform a sensitivity exercise where the rate of increase in energy efficiency is 
1.5% or 1% instead of zero per year (i.e., r = 0.015/year or 0.01/year). The price of carbon is 
unaffected. The safe carbon budget is also unaffected and remains at 1,046 GtC as in the benchmark. 
Equation (4) indicates, however, that the transition to the carbon-free era then takes longer, 85 or 72 
years, respectively, instead of 56 years. 
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9. Implementing the 2°C Target 
At the 2015 Paris Summit it has been agreed to limit global warming well below 2°C and to drive 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to even further 1.5°C. This is lower than justified by the 
damages of global warming estimated by economists and used by us. An extra safety margin may be 
justified to curb risks of tipping points and run-away global warming. A 2°C upper bound tells us from 
(5) or the bottom panel of Figure 1 that the associated carbon budget should be on average 411 GtC 
instead of 1000 GtC. Under the assumption that the damages used in our calibration are an under-
estimate, we raise damages just high enough to ensure that the carbon budget is compatible with the 
2°C cap on global warming. These higher damages require from (3) a higher carbon price: at the 
transition to the carbon-free era it should be 230$/tC for most scenarios. We back out from (4) that the 
transition to the carbon-free era is further brought forward from 56 to 30 years. These results are 
confirmed by simulations for the optimal baseline and the 2°C upper bound scenarios in our full-scale 
IAM as shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: The 2°C upper bound pushes up the required carbon price and requires steeper 
growth as the unconstrained price yields too high temperature rises (left). Fossil fuel emissions 
grow at the rate of economic growth until renewable energy is cheaper. The carbon tax brings 
forward the carbon-free era and leaves a bigger fraction of stranded assets (right). 
 
An alternative to adjusting damages from global warming upwards to ensure that peak warming does 
not exceed 2°C is to abstract from damages entirely and simply minimise the present discounted value 
of costs subject to the constraint that peak warming must not exceed 2°C. This is what is done in the 
integrated assessment literature and the resulting price of carbon follows a Hotelling path and thus 
rises more rapidly at a rate equal to the rate of interest instead of the rate of economic growth (e.g., 
Nordhaus, 1982; Tol, 2013; Bauer et al., 2015). The more rapidly rising price of carbon then reflects 
the increasing scarcity of carbon as the carbon budget approaches exhaustion. However, if allowance 
is made for the inertia between changes in global mean temperature and the stock of atmospheric 
carbon, the optimal price of carbon may follow a inverse U-shaped path and grows more slowly than 
the Hotelling path (Lemoine and Rudik, 2017). Combining the two approach by maximising welfare 
net of global warming subject to the cap on peak warming or equivalently subject to cumulative 
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emissions being less than the safe carbon budget gives a higher price of carbon than the unconstrained 
welfare maximisation which grows at a rate somewhere in between the interest rate and the rate of 
economic growth (van der Ploeg, 2017).  
 
10. Performance of the Simple Rules 
Most integrated assessment modellers make many additional, and perhaps more realistic, assumptions 
about economic damages of climate change or dynamics of specific energy sources, and crunch out the 
optimal price of carbon (and sometimes also the stock of stranded fossil fuel assets) by numerically 
maximising welfare subject to the constraints of their large-scale IAM. The question is how well our 
simple rules (1) through (5) perform and compare with the optimal time path of carbon prices, carbon 
budgets and transition times derived from more complex optimising IAMs. Table 3 therefore 
compares them with the globally optimal discretionary outcomes and the BAU outcomes for our IAM 
with DICE damages and Oxford carbon and temperature dynamics.12 
 Parameters Optimal carbon budget Peak temperature Initial price 
Scenario RTI IIA g SDR 
full 
IAM 
toy 
IAM 
full 
IAM 
toy 
IAM 
full 
IAM 
Toy 
IAM 
Conventional (2x2x2) 2% 2 2% 6 % 1,307GtC 1,293 GtC 3.06°C 3.07°C 20 $/tC 12 $/tC 
Baseline (Nordhaus) 1.5% 1.45 2% 4.4 % 979 GtC 1,025 GtC 2.73°C 2.78°C 29 $/tC 27 $/tC 
Lower discounting 0.1% 1.45 2% 3 % 569 GtC 525 GtC 2.24°C 2.16°C 81 $/tC 95 $/tC 
Lower IIA 1.5% 1 2% 3.5 % 759 GtC 748 GtC 2.47°C 2.45°C 51 $/tC 55 $/tC 
Lower trend growth 1.5% 1.45 1% 3 % 805 GtC 820 GtC 2.53°C 2.54°C 37 $/tC 38 $/tC 
Business-As-Usual 
full IAM   Cumulative emissions: 2250 - 2300 GtC   Peak temperature: 3.89°C 
toy IAM   Cumulative emissions: 2230 - 2275 GtC   Peak temperature: 3.84°C 
Table 3: The simple rules predict the fully-fledged IAM outcomes in terms of cumulative 
emissions and peak temperature well. They also predict the deleterious effects of policy inaction. 
Our toy IAM performs remarkably well, despite being based on a simple 2-box carbon cycle, and 
adapts accurately to changes in ethical judgement and technological progress (cf. Rezai and van der 
Ploeg, 2016). Cumulative fossil use differs by at most 8%, peak temperature by 0.08°C, and the initial 
optimal carbon price by 14 $/tC.13 The transition times are also predicted well by the simple rules 
(e.g., for the baseline 55 and 56 years for the IAM and for the simple rule, respectively. The social 
optimum avoids the peak temperatures of around 3.9°C by locking up much more fossil fuel than the 
average 2,250 GtC burnt under BAU and by transitioning to the carbon-free era in 56 years instead of 
the end of the century. 
 
11. Carbon Capture and Sequestration as Backstop 
                                                            
12 With uncertainty about future consumption growth, the SDR in the baseline is cut by 0.14% per annum. This 
curbs the carbon budget and peak global warming by only 36 GtC and 0.04°C, respectively. 
13 Allen (2016) proposes an initial carbon tax of 91 $/tC (25 $/tCO2) in a framework with SDR  g = 1.5%/yr 
and where marginal damages and the carbon tax (2) are linear in GDP.  
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Allen et al. (2009) have argued that there should be a mandate that ensures all carbon emissions above 
the budget compatible with 2°C global warming should be captured and sequestrated. Allen (2016) 
further argued that considerations for the near-term mitigation efforts induced by pricing carbon 
should be disregarded for long-term impacts of the carbon price for sequestration efforts once the 
optimal carbon budget will have been reached. Although this plea resonates, a simple cap is not 
necessarily an efficient strategy. It is more efficient to price carbon as this offers a direct incentive to 
capture and sequester carbon (as well as to make renewable energy more attractive to use and develop 
and to phase out fossil fuel more quickly). Furthermore, a price for carbon allows trading to promote 
the least costly cuts in carbon emissions. It avoids the government “picking winners” and instead 
promotes development of a wide variety of renewable energy sources including carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS). This is important as CCS will, like many other potential new sources of 
renewable energy, be at most a partial solution to the climate challenge. But CCS faces particular 
challenges: huge capital investments, environmental hazards and ugly NIMBY politics. Also, as CCS 
requires lots of space it is difficult to scale up as costs rise as space is used up. Abatement with CCS 
(e.g., new coal, coal retrofit, industrial) is still one of the more expensive forms of abatement. 
Analytically, the cost of fossil fuel with CCS equals   10 0( ) (1 ) / ( )
et
EE t E r S S t  per ton of carbon 
plus the marginal cost of abating one ton of carbon, say A. This is indicated by the upward-sloping 
dotted black line in Figure 1. It follows that, like fossil fuel on its own, the cost of CCS rises as 
reserves are depleted. It thus only becomes attractive for the market when the marginal cost of 
abatement falls below the carbon price. This happens once GDP and the carbon price have risen far 
enough or when new technology has diminished the cost of CCS sufficiently, but working against this 
is that once CCS is scaled up space becomes ever more costly. Given these cost developments, CCS is 
likely to be dominated by various forms of renewable energy in the market. Forcing it on the market 
by mandating it is thus an inefficient way to achieve climate objectives and one would hope one does 
not have to resort to this once it is too late to rely on conventional, more cost-effective climate policies 
to curb emissions. 
 
12. Conclusion 
Our assessment of how the optimal carbon price and stranded assets interact with economic growth, 
renewable energy technology, fossil fuel scarcity, ethical considerations, and fundamental geophysical 
parameters is transparent and gives easy-to-understand simple rules that perform well in large-scale 
IAMs. These rules are transparent and robust and in this sense more useful than a discretionary time 
path of optimal climate policies usually obtained from IAMs. We hope that our back-on-the-envelope 
framework allows climate scientists not actively engaged in economic modelling to understand the 
critical assumptions driving the social cost and price of carbon, untapped fossil fuel and the time to 
reach the carbon-free era in terms of ethical considerations and expected economic growth and cost 
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reductions in renewable energy. In our framework exogenous improvements in energy efficiency do 
not affect the optimal price of carbon or the safe carbon budget, but do delay the transition time to the 
carbon-free era. 
Our results suggest that the global warming damages estimated and ethical assumptions chosen by 
economists are likely to lead to global warming that exceeds the 2°C target. To ensure that global 
warming always stays below 2°C, the carbon price must be raised above what conventional economic 
damages tell us to do and more fossil fuel must be locked up. Recent estimates of the non-climate 
related health benefits of abandoning fossil fuels (e.g. Parry et al., 2014; Thompson et al., 2014; West 
et al., 2013), the effects of uncertainty about the steepness of climate damages (Crost and Traeger, 
2014) and the potential of multiple abrupt disruptions in the climate system (Cai et al., 2016; Lemoine 
and Traeger, 2016) provide ample reasons for raising the carbon price.  
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Appendix 
A.1. Cumulative Emissions and Peak Warming 
Allen et al. (2009) present a reduced-form model of the climate and argue that cumulative emissions in 
all future years – rather than the actual emissions profile – matters for peak warming. Figure A.1 
presents the relationship between peak temperature and this carbon budget in TtC for over 500 
simulations in the optimising variant of our IAM. The quadratic approximation used in our toy IAM is 
robust and very well determined. The DICE model displays a similar relationship between peak 
warming and cumulative emissions.  
 
Figure A.1: A robust relationship between the carbon budget and peak warming for the Oxford 
system based on 500+ simulations in our optimising IAM.  
 
Allen (2016) states that a global temperature increase in line with cumulative CO2 emissions suggests 
the following simple expression for the temperature response to a pulse emission of an additional ton 
of CO2 at time t:  
(A1) 
'
' (1 ),
KS t
t tTemp TCRE e
 
      
where 1/KS is the initial pulse-adjustment time scale of the climate system (of order decade or less) 
and TCRE is the approximately constant transient climate response to cumulative emissions. This is 
valid for cumulative emissions up to 5,000 GtC and gives the linear approximation 
(A2) 00.9 C ,PW TCRE B     
where Allen (2016) uses an initial temperature of and a mid-range value of 2°C/TtC.TCRE   
Although this linear approximation performs reasonable well for low levels of peak warming (see plot 
in Figure A.1), we use a quadratic approximation which is calibrated to the carbon cycle of the full 
IAM both in terms of the initial temperature intercept and the slope. 
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A.2. Parameter Combinations for 2°C 
Working backward form a peak warming target of 2°C, we can use (5) to obtain a carbon budget of 
411 GtC. We can then use our rules for the carbon tax (1) and (2), and the carbon budget (3) to find 
out which parameter combinations would make the 2°C target feasible. Table A.2 collects the pairs of 
(g, SDR) consistent with 2°C of warming. These can be achieved through combinations of the rate of 
time impatience (RTI) and the coefficient of relative intergenerational inequality aversion (IIA). Higher 
levels of growth permit a higher SDR. Since (ignoring the prudence term) ,SDR RTI IIA g    the 
permissible values for RTI are higher and the values for IIA lower.  
For example, with an economic growth rate of 2% per annum, the RTI would have to be between 0%–
0.8% with a corresponding aversion parameter of 1.4–1. If the trend growth rate rises to 3 percent per 
annum, the RTI has to be between 0%–0.9% with a corresponding aversion parameter of 1.3–1. The 
reason for limiting IIA is that as economic growth rises, future generations are deemed rich enough to 
handle slightly higher temperature increases (in the absence of abrupt climate change). To offset this 
effect and maintain the 2°C target, the permissible parameter range for IIA is lowered as the trend 
economic growth rate increases.  
RTI IIA g SDR 
0 % 1.7 1% 1.7 % 
0.25 % 1.45 1% 1.7 % 
0.7 % 1 1% 1.7 % 
0 % 1.4 2% 2.8 % 
0.8 % 1 2% 2.8 % 
0 % 1.3 3% 3.9 % 
0.9 % 1 3% 3.9 % 
Table A.2: Parameter combinations that achieve the target of 2°C ignoring prudence. Higher 
trend growth requires less patience and a lower rate of intergenerational inequality aversion.  
At the time of the switch to the carbon-free era, 2038, the carbon price has to be 250 $/tC in the 2°C 
scenario. The baseline carbon price is then 147.5 $/tC. Lowering the utility discount rate, keeping IIA 
at 1.45, to zero only raises the carbon price to 108 $/tC so that global warming still exceeds 2°C. If the 
RTI is cut to zero and the IIA to 1.4 or the RTI is cut to 0.8% and IIA to 1, the target of 2°C is 
compatible with DICE damages. 
 
A.3. Description of the optimising IAM 
The economic core of our optimising IAM is presented in Rezai and van der Ploeg (2016). However, 
here we use the Oxford carbon cycle (e.g., Allen, et al., 2009) instead of the carbon cycle of DICE or 
of Golosov et al. (2014). We use our IAM instead of DICE, since we have scarcity rents on fossil fuel 
and allow extraction costs of fossil fuel to rise as reserves get depleted in order to solve for the optimal 
amount of stranded assets. The economic part of our IAM is calibrated to data for 2010: world GDP is 
66 trillion US $, the initial capital stock is 150 trillion US $ and initial energy use is 9.94 GtCe. The 
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world population is 7 billion initially and is assumed to stabilise at 11 billion at the end of the century. 
We assume a depreciation rate for capital of 10% per annum and a Cobb-Douglas technology with 
30% and 70% as the shares of capital and labour, respectively. We assume that for each trillion of 
output that is produced 0.150   GtC of fossil fuel is needed, which is in line with a Leontief 
technology. The initial cost of renewable energy (0)b  is initially $800/tCe. The rate of technical 
progress in renewable energy is 1% per annum until the price of renewable energy reaches its lower 
floor of $400/tCe near the end of the century. The cost function for oil extraction has $350/tC 
0
( 0.35)e  which gives the share of energy in output of about 5%. Extraction costs evolve with 
1
0.5e  and the initial stock of fossil fuel reserves is 10,000 GtC. This means that initially renewable 
energy is more than twice as expensive as fossil energy initially but renewable energy has the potential 
to reach current energy prices after all learning has happened. 
Our optimising IAM has an initial phase where only fossil fuel is used in the production process, an 
intermediate phase where fossil fuel and renewable energy are used alongside each other, and a final 
phase where only renewable energy is used. The economic block of our IAM consists of a capital 
accumulation equation with an associated Euler equation for the optimal expected growth in 
consumption per capita and a depletion equation for fossil fuel reserves with an associated modified 
Hotelling rule describing the scarcity rent as the present value of all future reductions in marginal 
extraction costs of fossil fuel resulting from burning one ton of carbon today. The Oxford carbon cycle 
consists relative to the DICE and the 2-box carbon cycle of Golosov et al. (2014) of a relatively large 
number of dynamic equations (i.e., 7) describing the stocks of carbon in the atmosphere and the 
oceans as well as global temperature. These carbon cycle difference equations have an associated 
number of difference equations for the co-states, which generate the social cost of carbon. Our full 
optimising IAM thus consists of 9 difference equations for the states and another 9 for the co-states. 
Our solution algorithm for this 18-dimensional two-point-boundary-value-problem solves our IAM in 
a forward-looking manner such that the transversality conditions are satisfied.  
Finally, it should be acknowledged that recently IAMs have been criticised for their lack of proper 
underpinnings (e.g., Pindyck, 2013). In particular, it is difficult to assess the costs and benefits of 
cutting global warming many decades and centuries ahead, especially when it comes to costs of global 
warming, the climate sensitivity and key ethical parameters. In defence, it has been argued that using 
an IAM is better than no IAM and that there is no reliable alternative to calculate the social cost of 
carbon (e.g., Metcalf and Stock, 2015). Although IAMs are useful in policy debates, we believe their 
results are difficult to communicate and comprehend. This is the main reason why we advocate the use 
of transparent and simple framework and an easy-to-understand rule. This ensures that the 
communication to policy makers is easier whilst not suggesting more scientific precision than is 
warranted (cf. Pindyck, 2017). 
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